1.1 Environmental Security in Doctrine

There is only one formal environmental security guideline in UN or related international organization doctrine for military action. The UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin of 6 August 1999 entitled "Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law" states:

Additionally, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) charter (the Rome Statute), Article 8(2)(b)(iv) uses the same language to define war crimes related to the environment as: "...widespread, long-term, and [causing] severe damage to the natural environment." The charter was completed in July 1998 with a 120-7 vote for approval. The U.S. was one of the seven countries who voted against it. Nevertheless, it is expected that the ICC will open within three years as the permanent mechanism for prosecuting war crimes.

The August 1999, Secretary-General’s Bulletin and the ICC’s charter did not define "widespread," "long-term," or "severe." However, Protocol One of the Geneva Convention had an official commentary that defined "long-term" as "measured in decades." Unfortunately, this definition would require either waiting years to see if the environmental damage persists or accepting long-range forecasts of impacts before deciding whether the standard has been violated.

This same language is also used in Article One of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD): "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injure to any other State Party." According to the Environmental Law Institute (ELI), ENMOD

1.2 Environmental Security in UN Peacekeeping Operations

While the UN has a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the function is without specific authorization in the UN Charter. Peacekeeping has been characterized as "Chapter 6 ½" of the Charter, falling between Chapter 6 on pacific settlement of disputes and Chapter 7 on action with respects to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.

In the absence of an entity devoted to peacekeeping – whether autonomous specialized agency (food, health, labor) or a semi-autonomous program (refugees, population, children) – the basic document creating and governing a peacekeeping operation is a Security Council Resolution.

A second essential element of a peacekeeping operation is the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) negotiated with the host country or countries.

While the scope of this brief study would not permit a detailed review of all Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping, one of the authors of this report, Joe Sills, having been intimately familiar with the scope and content of these resolutions during his UN career, recalled no reference in any of them to environmentally related mandates to govern activities of UN forces. A selective review of a number of resolutions confirmed this. Further, telephone interviews with officials of both DPKO and the Security Council Division of the Department of Political Affairs confirmed that no mandates or instructions regarding environmental security in the theater were included in any Council resolution.

Surprisingly, UN sources state that there are no references to environmental standards or goals in the "model SOFA," nor could they recall any in various agreements as negotiated with countries hosting UN operations, even as regards such basics as cleanup following departure. It was indicated that, on a case-by-case basis, individual contingents would work these matters out with local officials at the time of departure, but without formal guidance.

Following the termination of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina presented the UN with a bill for some $70 million for various items, including some alleged environmental damage. However, the UN did not accept this claim, and no payment was made.

After the closing of the Kosovar refugee camp in Albania earlier this year, the Albanian government sought directly from the United States funds to return a site (which had been built for use by UNHCR) to its original state. While this matter is still under discussion, there is a possibility that the site as developed could be adapted for an alternate, economically valuable use, rather than dismantling it.

DPKO has issued a series of handbooks for field operations, such as those for civilian police and military observers. Discussions with DPKO confirm that no such handbook, or other formal written guidelines, have been issued dealing with environmental security nor, to the best of their knowledge, have there been consideration of doing so.

In the absence of such guidelines, what environmental rules do UN peacekeeping forces in the field follow? Due to the considerable autonomy contingents have at the operational level, they follow instructions and guidelines promulgated by their governments for their own troops. As a result, these standards vary, perhaps significantly, from contingent to contingent. This variance not only creates discrepancies in actual operations, but also has the potential to create friction between the UN and host governments and people due to uneven attention given to environmental concerns. (Note: Defining Environmental Security: Implications for the US Army: Atlanta, Army Environmental Policy Institute, 1998 notes that "the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to list environmental security, ‘including the reclamation of contaminated military sites, regional environmental problems and natural and man-made disasters’, among its most important priorities." Interviews suggested that Canada and Australia had particularly good policies in this regard.)

In sum, the link between UN peacekeeping and environmental security has simply not been made within the UN, either conceptually or operationally, nor is there any indication in the literature reviewed or the telephone interviews conducted that the matter has been given any thought, much less serious thought.

1.3 Environmental Consideration in Past Conflict

Professor Bruce Russett of Yale makes the point:

The UN has not as yet dealt with environmental implications and the effects of their peacekeeping operations. Rather, the UN has established the practice of sending missions to assess environmental impacts of conflicts of international significance after the fact, such as the Gulf War and recently in the Kosovo region.

The following examples illustrate this point.

1.3.1 The environmental consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontations were the subject of numerous decisions taken by the UNEP's Governing Council in the 1980s. Nearly every session adopted a decision condemning Israeli actions that led to environmental damage. A considerable number of decisions were taken on the remnants of military operations – mainly anti-personnel mines.

1.3.2 In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and following a series of Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) that failed to reverse the Iraqi action, a coalition of forces, acting with Security Council authorization, but not under UN command, began an air campaign in mid-January 1991. On 27 February, Kuwait City was liberated by the follow-up ground operation, and on the same day Iraq announced that its armed forces had withdrawn from Kuwait.

Measures to evaluate and compensate for environmental damage caused by the invasion and withdrawal actions (specifically, setting fire to Kuwait oil wells and deliberately spilling oil in the Persian Gulf) were an integral part of the Security Council resolutions giving terms for ending the hostilities. SCR 687, adopted on 3 April 1991, was the longest and probably most complex set of decisions ever taken by the Council. The UN Environment Program (UNEP) was involved in the assessment of the ecological damage.

Section E of the resolution reaffirms Iraq’s liability for any direct loss or damage resulting from the invasion, "including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" and called for the creation of a fund, with resources from Iraq’s petroleum revenues, and a commission to administer the fund and disburse the awards. The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) was established by SCR 692 of 20 May, 1991 for adjudicating the amount of damage claims, and the Governing Council of the Commission approved, in December 1996, an award of $610 million to Kuwait for the costs of extinguishing the oil well fires set by retreating Iraqi troops, and cleaning up the residue.

This was the first time an international entity was ever charged with the assessment and valuation of environmental damage from war, and awarding financial compensation. A side result of the Iraqi invasion and its aftermath was the adoption of a resolution by the UN General Assembly on "the protection of the environment in time of conflict" (GA res. 47/37, November 1992) which stated that

However, these ICRC and UN General Assembly efforts related to armed conflict among (and, presumably, within, in the case of the ICRC Guidelines) states are not specifically related to practice of UN peacekeeping operations deployed following (or to prevent) conflicts. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) was created to deter boundary violations and report on hostile activities. No mention was made in the Security Council Resolution creating UNIKOM of responsibilities related to the environment, other than noting that mines and unexploded ordnance would have to be cleared for safety purposes.

1.3.3 In the case of Cambodia, there is available an authoritative, independent study of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which analyzes UNTAC's operations from conception to termination. Heininger observes that "no [UN] mission has matched that in Cambodia for the scope of responsibilities… or the degree of control exercised by the United Nations over the internal workings of a country."

Two environmentally related concerns were identified early by UNTAC.

First, the advance team included a twenty-person ‘mine awareness’ group, but no actual clearance operations were undertaken by them. In spite of the early recognition and gravity of the problem, Heininger notes that, "lack of emphasis on mine clearance in the early stages of the UN operation…was to have serious repercussions for reparation efforts later because mine clearance operations could not keep up with demand for mine-free land." It is relevant that the Secretary-General’s implementation plan for UNTAC assigned responsibility for assisting with mine clearance, including training and mine awareness programs, to UNTAC’s military wing.

Second, "UNTAC early on recognized the serious threat posed to Cambodia’s environment and its economic future by overexploitation of natural resources, particularly the rapid depletion of timber stocks and gem mines." It must be noted that the income from these sources was largely financing the Khmer Rouge, which made this concern particularly acute.

One of the two areas in which Heininger gives UNTAC highest marks (the other being the work of the information and education units) was the ‘quick impact’ projects and civic action programs. These small-scale efforts were undertaken by individual military contingents, frequently on their own initiative and at their expense. Several of them dealt with environmentally related matters, such as providing potable water and sanitation facilities to villages. This type of small-scale project has also been undertaken by other UN peacekeeping operations, for example, by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon.

1.3.4 A recent United Nations effort not related to peacekeeping operations provides an interesting example. The escalation of violence in Kosovo since 1997 and the NATO air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which began in late March 1999 led the Secretary-General to propose, and the government of the FRY to agree, to sending a UN Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) in May 1999. The NAM visited the FRY in late May, and on 9 June the Secretary-General submitted its report to the Security Council (S/1999/662).

The primary objective of the NAM was "to provide an initial assessment of the emergency needs of civilian populations and of the medium-term rehabilitation requirements in the country in the light of the approaching winter." This initial assessment was to be followed by a more in-depth assessment, as well as by sectorial evaluations by relevant agencies. A senior representative of the UN Environment Program (UNEP) was a member of the NAM.

The mission’s conclusions related to the environment were centered on the effects of NATO air attacks on more than eighty industrial facilities. The report states:

UNEP moved quickly, conducting a series of missions to assess ecological damage at industrial sites, including taking of samples that were analyzed; going up and down the Danube assessing water quality; and looking at biodiversity issues. These findings were consolidated in the UN report released on October 15, 1999: The Kosovo Conflict - Consequences for the Environment & Human Settlements.

UNEP’s responsibilities in the NAM and the follow-up indicate a greater role for UNEP in environmentally-related aspects of military action as they are a part of the overall role of the UN as chronicled in Appendix B.

In the Yugoslavia case, numerous environmental assessment missions have essentially come to the conclusion that there is no Yugoslav eco-catastrophe. Instead, action was urged for several hotspots left by NATO. The finding by the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) was that there were severe strains on fresh-water and sewage facilities in Albania, due to the need to construct large refugee camps with little time for prior planning. Appendix B is a collection of media statements related to NATO’s bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, as an example of case analysis of environmental consequences of war.

Although the UN has not expressed much interest in environmental security, the academic community has picked it up and is developing the concept. The latest notion of 'human security' includes environmental security as its prominent component. It is interesting that in all recent warfare operations, the offensive side ignored environmental effects, while the defensive side usually raised that issue as a collateral one in claiming compensation for damage such as human loss, material damage, etc. UN assistance, including UN peacekeeping forces, was usually invited (called for) by the defensive party. Sometimes scientists forecast frightening effects of military actions spreading almost all over the globe. That was a conclusion about the environmental impact of oil field fires in Iraq during the Gulf war that was never realized and quickly forgotten.

The lack of UN instructions for its peacekeepers regarding the environment can be partly explained by the lack of coherent (harmonized) position of (and among) nation-states on environmental harm during war/military operations.

The military's activities during peace-time (military ammunition production, storage, waste, transportation, training, etc.) are usually very closely followed and scrutinized by the public with the 'right to know' appeals to authorities. They insist that environmental 'peacetime' standards for companies should equally be applied to the military.

'Environmental rules' during military wartime activities are much fuzzier and vary from country to country and, as pointed out in the present paper, are difficult to reconcile for UN peacekeepers from different countries. International conventions concerning environmental effects of warfare usually set fairly broad limits. Although it is generally recognized that international environmental conventions are not applicable to warfare situations (unless they specifically deal with military operations such as the ENMOD convention), the Environmental Law Institute is exploring arguments that certain environmental treaties may apply to such wartime situations.